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Abstract. In this paper, fault diagnostic advisory system developed by using 
the combination of Univariate Statistical Process Control (SPC) and Hazard 
and Operability (HAZOP) study supported by rule-based approach is 
presented. Firstly, a plant model was simulated by using commercial HYSYS. 
PlantTM simulator.  Moving-Range (x-MR) Chart and HAZOP study were used 
to define the causes and consequences of process deviation based on selected 
parameter for each study node. Fault is considered to occur if one variable is 
out of control limit. The advisory system has successfully detected and 
diagnosed the deviations and displayed the causes and consequences of the 
faults. Although the scheme was developed based on precut fractionation 
column, the algorithm of fault detection and diagnosis can be extended to 
other chemical process by changing the x-MR chart and HAZOP study for 
each selected monitoring variables. 
 
Key Words:  Fault Diagnostic Advisory System, Hazard and Operability 
Study, x-MR Chart. 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Poor control or process disruption might lead to plant shutdown and such situations are 
expected to be solved by human operators with the assistance of an alarm system [1].  If 
correcting abnormal events is fully reliance on human operators, they might tend to make 
erroneous decisions and take actions which make matters even worse. Literature has shown 
that most industrial accidents are caused by human errors and these abnormal events have 
significant economic, safety and environmental impacts [2]. Hence, fault detection and 
diagnosis is one of the means for process safety management to aid the operator in 
improving the process operation. 
In the area of plant-wide control at the supervisory level, the process fault detection 
and diagnosis system plays a key role. Foreseeable, the important of a supervisory system 
and the potential of computer to provide closer supervision and better information of 
process safety by monitoring critical parameters and, when circumstances warrant it, 
initializing and carrying out a safe shutdown.  
 
2.0 THEORY 
Fault can be defined as defect or imperfection of character, structure, or appearance. For a 
plant or instrumentation, faults are deviations from intended operation. Iserman and Balle 
(1997) defined fault as an unpermitted deviation  of  at  least one characteristic  property  or  
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parameter of the system from the acceptable, usual and standard condition. Meanwhile, 
Himmelblau (1978) defined fault as a departure from an acceptable range of an observed 
variable or a calculated parameter associated with a process. 
Diagnosis consists of two different but closely related procedures. The first step is 
to receive response of the system through measuring device. The second step is to make a 
decision on the state of the system based on the sensory values. Researchers seek a way of 
using a computer to mimic human reasoning. There are different search techniques that can 
be applied to perform diagnosis based on the available process knowledge. 
Venkatasubramanian (2003) and his partner has summarized the basic approach in 
implementing diagnostic system. Knowledge engineering and advanced software tools such 
as expert systems can also be used for process supervision purposes.     
Variation usually occurs in the manufacturing process. The variation will not only 
effect the product specifications but also will lead to damage and disaster. Principles of 
statistics are considered as technique to detect the variation of parameter. Statistical Process 
Control (SPC) has been established as an important part of quality control in monitoring 
the values of all process variables and parameters of a product that have an effect on 
quality and provide the way to monitor chemical and other processes. Process control 
engineers use SPC to monitor a process’s stability, consistency and overall performance.  
Lees (1996) classified hazard analysis methodologies into: the starting point of 
analysis, the direction of inference and the scope of analysis (qualitative or quantitative). 
Hazard is defined as an inherent potential of a material or activity to harm people, property, 
or the environment. It does not have a probability component. The specific tool, Hazard 
Operability (HAZOP) Study, commonly uses a multidisciplinary team to identify, analyze, 
and control hazards systematically. The main output of the fault detection and diagnosis 
algorithm focuses on the condition, location, time, causes, and consequences of a process 
fault. 
 
3.0 EXPERIMENTAL 
Fatty acid precut fractionation column has been selected as a case study and the plant 
model was developed by Ling (2004) using HYSYS.PlantTM simulator as shown in Figure 
1. Some modification of the plant model was done to speed up the simulation such as; the 
pumparound section which consists of an internal direct contact condenser is not available 
within the HYSYS model library. Therefore, modifications of the standard column 
template are carried out to produce an equivalent configuration. 
The precut fractionation column is commonly used to separate palm kernel oil. 
Distillate products consist of C8 and C10 and the net bottom product is pumped to the next 
columns for further separation. The process involves two types of operation: reflux and 
pump around. In the HYSYS model, two separation columns with mixture and accumulator 
are required to perform the pump around process. The observation streams and HAZOP 
analysis is carried out based on fractionation column as shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 1 Plant model for precut fractionation process [6] 
 
Fault Diagnostic Advisory (FDA) has developed based on the application of 
Mean and Moving Range chart and HAZOP study and supported by expert system 
approaches. Process deviation is detected by comparing the actual process data for each 
monitoring variables (data set) with x-MR chart.  The limits are calculated based on a 
normal processing sampling data. Process deviation is considered to take place if any data 
us found to be located out of the region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Case study - precut column 
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The limits for the individual chart are the same as the usual of Shewhart control charts [7]: 
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Meanwhile, the limits for moving-range chart use the regular range chart [7]:  
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In Figure 3, Phases I and II are steps to gather knowledge (knowledge acquisition) 
and store them in a database. Meanwhile, Phase III is the step to structure the knowledge 
base (knowledge representation). In Phase IV, FDA prototype was developed based on 
expert system approaches and the collected knowledge base. This prototype was developed 
by using Borland C++ Builder (BCB) 6.0 programming language. Study nodes were 
defined based on monitoring variables and consequently HAZOP study was carried out on 
these nodes. The definition of monitoring variables is shown in Table 1. Table 2 states the 
nodes for HAZOP study. 
 
Table 1 Sensor and monitoring variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sensor 
Monitoring 
Variables 
(Stream) 
Measured 
Variables 
S1 TIC 100 Temperature (Celsius) 
S2 Reflux  Flow (kg/h) 
S3 Bottom Flow  (kg/h) 
S4 Distillate Flow (kg/h) 
S5 FIC 105 Flow (kg/h) 
S6 TIC 101 Temperature (Celsius) 
S7 PI 104 Pressure (kPa) 
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Compute limits by using x-MR chart tool and a 
normal distribution data set 
Conduct conventional HAZOP study for 
each stream in plant model 
Store the limits in the database desktop 
Choose fault scenarios and analyzer to be detected 
and diagnosed based on existing sensor from plant 
model 
Identify hazard for each selected study node 
Store the HAZOP study in the database 
desktop 
Develop knowledge representation - production 
rule 
Phase I 
Develop inference engine for advisory 
system using Borland C++ Builder 6.0 
Phase II 
Phase 
III 
Phase 
IV 
Develop plant model using HYSYS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Fault diagnostic advisory system development flowchart 
 
 
Table 2 Nodes for HAZOP study 
 
Nodes Deviations 
Node 1 Line From Reboiler to Column 
Node 2 Line Reflux Tee-Out to Reflux stream 
Node 3 From P-101 to Bottom stream 
Node 4 Line To-VLV-100 to Distillate stream 
Node 5 Line To Pumparound return stream to Pumparound return stream 
Node 6 From E-100 to Distillate stream  
Node 7 Top Column 
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4.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Plant model for the case study was developed by using HYSYS.Plant simulator and was 
used to compute the x-MR acceptable ranges as shown in Table 3. Analyses such as 
Autocorrelation, Skewness, Kurtosis, and Boxplot were performed to show the data set was 
random with normal distribution. Fault is defined if one point of data goes beyond the 
limits where it gives a signal when a signal shifts in the position of the mean or an increase 
in the standard deviation of the process [9]. 
Two types of optimization study were carried out in the design of the fault 
diagnosis algorithm. These include the examination of process variables and the sensitivity 
analysis. The optimization studies were used to determine the exact causes and 
consequences of the fault that might occur in the plant process. Sensitivity analysis was 
carried out for each controller as well as in HAZOP study to specify the possible causes 
and consequences of a deviation process. HAZOP study for this research encompasses of 
seven study nodes as stated in Table 2.  
Upper and lower limits for x-MR chart and a sample of HAZOP study are shown 
in Tables 3 and 4 respectively. The FDA system consists of a user interface, a knowledge 
base and an inference engine. Forward chaining strategy was used to search the knowledge 
base by repeatedly examine existing facts and rules that matched and compare these facts 
to the information furnished from the process data. For example, a fault was detected by 
comparing the process variables data with the limits data. Then, the cause and location of 
the fault and a suitable countermeasure were extracted from the knowledge base. 
 
Table 3 Upper and lower limits 
 
Sensor UCLx LCLx UCLMR LCLMR 
S1 = TIC 100 
(Celsius) 238.40 236.37 1.24 0 
S2 = FIC 101 
(kg/h) 3159.04 3064.41 58.14 0 
S3 = Bottom 
(kg/h) 9734.18 9342.48 240.64 0 
S4 = Distillate 
(kg/h) 979.93 421.19 330.96 0 
S5 = FIC 105 
(kg/h) 8848.69 8165.82 554.61 0 
S6 = TIC 101 
(Celsius) 79.09 77.51 0.96 0 
S7 = PIC 104 
(kPa) 7.92 7.27 0.40 0 
 
The computed limits and result of HAZOP study were used in developing the two 
types of production rule: Rule I and Rule II. Rule I consists of measurement space, feature 
space and decision space. The relationship of Rule I is - If ‘Variable’ and If ‘Limits’, Then 
“Process deviation of monitoring variable”. Meanwhile, Rule II is used to reach the end 
result of fault diagnostic task and consisted of class space and qualitative information. The 
followings are the sample coding of Rule I and Rule II. Figure 4 illustrated the architecture 
and flow of the FDA algorithm. 
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Rule I:      
IF:        i) S1 (measurement space) and    
ii) Bigger than ‘243.09’,      (feature space) 
                             THEN:              More Temperature   (decision space) 
 
(Programming Source Code) 
    Premise:                   if (atof(s1) > (b)) 
      Action:          
            {     action1 = 'L'; 
                                Label18->Font->Color=clRed; 
                                Label18->Caption= "MORE"; 
           firstDet1='H';    } 
 
Table 4 Sample of HAZOP worksheet for node 1 
 
Deviations Causes Consequences 
More 
Temperature 
• Reboiler overheated due to wrong setting 
of reboiler duty 
• Reboiler runs nearly dry 
• Reboiler tube leaks 
• Less flow from column to reboiler 
• High flowrate of steam to reboiler 
• Column overheated 
• Pressure high in column 
• Inefficient stripping    
     process 
• Off-spec of product 
Less 
Temperature 
• Low setting of reboiler duty 
• Tubes failed in a reboiler heater 
• Less steam input to reboiler  
• Fouling of tube reboiler leading to 
reduced heat transfer 
• Hardness of the boiler feed water 
• More  flow from column to reboiler 
• Low thermal loading  
• Off-spec of product 
• Inefficient separation in column  
More 
Pressure 
• Reboiler runs nearly dry 
• TIC 100 failure  
• Blockage at stream From Column to 
Reboiler caused of fatty acid solidify 
• Flooding at trayout  
• Ineffective separation 
• Causing explosions 
• Off-spec of product 
Less 
Pressure 
• Reboiler malfunction 
• Too much steam expands across the 
nozzle of ejector 
• TIC 100 failure  
• Incorrect controller setpoint 
• Column Flooding 
• Ineffective separation 
• Off-spec of product 
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Engineers and operators 
User Interface 
• Modification of database 
• Display Fault Status 
Inference 
Engine - 
Forward 
Chaining 
External Database 
• Measured data, text file 
• Hazop database 
 
Knowledge base 
• Rule models. 
• Empirical data (Causes and Consequences fault)  
Check process condition of 
each parameter. 
Rule I = True Rule? 
To identify the 
process condition of 
each monitoring 
variable 
Analyze faults condition of each monitoring parameter 
No Process 
Deviation 
NO 
YES 
Check of Rule II 
End 
To determine 
causes and, 
consequences 
based on the 
condition from 
previous 
detection of each 
Study Nodes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Architecture of the developed algorithm 
 
DoQuery I as shown in the source code below is Query component where SQL 
statements were used to retrieve data from a physical database table (Database Desktop 
table) via the Borland Database Engine (BDE) table that contain causes and consequences 
of HAZOP knowledge. The following is the coding written in the properties of Query 
component: 
SELECT CAUSES FROM TEMPERATUREUL and 
SELECT CONSEQUENCES FROM TEMPERATUREUL 
 
Rule II: 
                       IF:  ‘S1 stream is ‘High’’, (class space) 
THEN: ‘S1 is More Temperature Causes, and Consequences’.  
              (qualitative information) 
(Programming Source Code) 
Premise:       if (s1 = firstDet1='H') 
Action:                       {   DoQuery1();   } 
 
The following is an example of coding for S1 where Query is also used to retrieve 
data from database table containing causes and consequences of HAZOP knowledge. 
TEMPERATUREUL is a coding of database which contains the knowledge of causes and 
consequences for S1 in more flow condition.  
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Automatically, results will 
be displayed on the user 
interface which included: 
 
• Process Condition 
• Condition for each 
sensor 
• Location of fault  
• Diagnosis results 
o Times and parameter 
of detected fault 
o x chart and MR chart  
o Causes and 
consequences of  
fault 
  
Note: Charts and time of 
detection for each sensor 
represented in a page set 
(S1 to S7) under the page 
set of Diagnosis Results. 
Choose a file to be 
analyzed by FDAS 
algorithm after 
clicking the 
ANALYZE button 
SELECT CAUSES FROM TEMPERATUREUL and 
SELECT CONSEQUENCES FROM TEMPERATUREUL 
 
SQL statement was also used for detecting the exact time of the deviated data. 
The following is the sample coding for variable S1 where ‘DATA’ is a database of data set 
to be analyzed and LIMITS is a database of control limit. ‘OR’ is used to get either the 
upper or the lower limits.  
SELECT TIMES, TEMPERATURE FROM DATA 
WHERE 
TEMPERATURE >= (SELECT TEMPERATUREUL FROM LIMITS) OR 
TEMPERATURE <= (SELECT TEMPERATURELL FROM LIMITS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Description of Fault Detection and Diagnosis interface 
 
Description of Fault Detection and Diagnosis interface is shown in Figure 5.  The 
main task of the discriminator in FDA system is to detect the occurrence of any process 
deviation, out of range data’s location and time. As shown in Figure 6, user need to click 
the ‘Analyze’ button to open a database with dump file format which consists of data set 
that will be used for analyses. Fault is detected if one value of the process variables 
deviates out of the limits. Test has been done on the developed prototype by changing a 
value of a data set to verify the efficiency of the system. For the case study, FIC 101 is 
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defined as Sensor 1. The result of the fault detection and diagnosis obtained is shown in 
Figure 7. The group box ‘Condition of Study Nodes’ shows ‘High Temperature’ at S2. 
Meanwhile, Figure 8 shows the time of the fault, the deviated fault value, and the control 
chart for each parameter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 FDD workspace (open file window) 
 
Inference engine examines information from the dump file with the premises of 
the rules.  The upper and lower limits for MR data FIC 101 (S2) monitoring variable are 
53.41 and 0 respectively.  Assume a data from dump file is 57.23, the inference engine 
repeatedly finds rules that are matched. From the rule below, searching strategy started 
with chain forward of premise of the Rule Ia. Rule Ia is triggered looking for the premise of 
another rule that matches the action part of the Rule Ia while Rule Ib and Rule Ic are 
discarded. Rule IIa matches the action of Rule Ia and hence, Rule IIa is triggered. Since, 
there are no more rules to trigger, the end results is reached where fault detected for From 
Reboiler = 'High' and DoQuery1.  
 
 
Rule Ia:   IF S2 > 53.41 
THEN Fault is Detected, S2= 'High' 
Rule Ib: IF S2< 0 
THEN Fault is Detected, S2 = 'Low' 
Rule Ic: IF (S2 <= 53.41 &  
S2 >= 01) 
THEN Fault is Detected, S2 = 'Normal' 
Rule IIa: IF Fault is Detected, S2 = 'High' 
THEN DoQuery1 
Rule IIb: IF Fault is Detected, S2 = 'Low' 
THEN DoQuery2 
Rule IIc:   IF S2  = 'Normal' 
THEN S2 in normal operation 
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Figure 7 End results of fault diagnostic algorithm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Time, causes and consequences results 
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Figure 9:  Results of x-MR chart for other sensors 
  (a)       (b) 
  (c)       (d) 
  (e)       (f) 
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to fire 
Rule 
Base 
Working 
Memory 
Fire 
Rule 
Rule Ia IF S2 > 3159.04,THEN Fault is Detected, 
S2= 'High' 
Rule Ib IF S2 < 3064.41,THEN Fault is Detected, 
S2 = 'Low' 
Rule Ic IF (S2 <= 3159.04 & S2 >= 
3064.41),THEN Fault is Detected, S2 = 'Normal' 
Rule Id:  IF S2 > 53.41, THEN Fault is Detected, 
S2= 'High', Rule Ie: IF S2 < 0, THEN Fault is 
Detected, S2 = 'Low',  
Rule If: IF (S2 <= 53.41 & S2 >= 01), THEN Fault 
is Detected, S2 = 'Normal',  
Rule IIa: IF Fault is Detected, S2 = 'High', THEN 
DoQuery1 
Rule IIb: IF Fault is Detected, S2 = 'Low', THEN 
DoQuery2 
Rule IIc: IF S2  = 'Normal', THEN S2 in normal 
operation 
. 
. 
. 
.  
S1- 237.4 
S2- 3345.1 
S3- 9645.1 
S4- 845.4 
S5- 8754.1 
S6- 78.1 
S7- 7.84 
 
 
Rule Found 
(a) 
Exit 
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rule to 
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Determine 
possible rules 
to fire 
Rule 
Base 
Working 
Memory 
Fire 
Rule 
Rule Ia IF S2 > 3159.04,THEN Fault is Detected, 
S2= 'High' 
Rule Ib IF S2 < 3064.41,THEN Fault is Detected, 
S2 = 'Low' 
Rule Ic IF (S2 <= 3159.04 & S2 >= 
3064.41),THEN Fault is Detected, S2 = 'Normal' 
Rule Id:  IF S2 > 53.41, THEN Fault is Detected, 
S2= 'High', Rule Ie: IF S2 < 0, THEN Fault is 
Detected, S2 = 'Low',  
Rule If: IF (S2 <= 53.41 & S2 >= 01), THEN Fault 
is Detected, S2 = 'Normal',  
Rule IIa: IF Fault is Detected, S2 = 'High', THEN 
DoQuery1 
Rule IIb: IF Fault is Detected, S2 = 'Low', THEN 
DoQuery2 
Rule IIc: IF S2  = 'Normal', THEN S2 in normal 
operation 
. 
. 
. 
.  
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S2= 'High' 
Rule Id:  IF S2 > 
53.41, THEN 
Fault is 
Detected, S2= 
'High' 
Rule Found 
(b) 
Once the discriminator has detected, the causes and consequences from the 
database are then displayed on the diagnostic windows as shown in Figure 8. Figure 9 
shows the results and x-MR chart for other sensors. Figure 10 show the forward chaining 
for FDA system in firing rules.  From Figure 10b, Rule Id was fired and added to Working 
Memory.  Based on the first fire rule, Rule IIa was fired. The execution shown high flow 
was detected at S2 and HAZOP study for S2 was obtained.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10a: Forward chaining procedure for FDA system 
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Rule IIa: IF Fault 
is Detected, S2 = 
'High', THEN 
DoQuery1 
 
Rule Found 
(c) 
Exit 
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Rule 
Base 
Working 
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.Rule Ia IF S2 > 3159.04,THEN Fault is Detected, 
S2= 'High' 
Rule Ib IF S2 < 3064.41,THEN Fault is Detected, 
S2 = 'Low' 
Rule Ic IF (S2 <= 3159.04 & S2 >= 
3064.41),THEN Fault is Detected, S2 = 'Normal' 
Rule Id:  IF S2 > 53.41, THEN Fault is Detected, 
S2= 'High', Rule Ie: IF S2 < 0, THEN Fault is 
Detected, S2 = 'Low',  
Rule If: IF (S2 <= 53.41 & S2 >= 01), THEN Fault 
is Detected, S2 = 'Normal',  
Rule IIa: IF Fault is Detected, S2 = 'High', THEN 
DoQuery1 
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DoQuery2 
Rule IIc: IF S2  = 'Normal', THEN S2 in normal 
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. 
. 
. 
.  
. 
. 
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High Flow was 
detected at S2, and 
HAZOP study from 
Query 1 was used 
Rule Found 
(d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10b  Forward chaining procedure for FDA system 
 
 
4.1 Results and Discussion for Offline FDA System 
Two samples of experiments were performed offline and discussed in the following.  This 
included failure sensor for FIC 101 and TIC 101.  The detected and diagnosed faults by 
FDA system were also discussed and explained with the illustration of user interface.  The 
main point of performing these experiments was to evaluate the detection and diagnose 
results in term of efficiency.  It is important to verify that the FDA algorithm is able to 
detect and diagnose fault.   
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In order to create a drift data, ±5% to ±10% bias was added to each sensor during 
the simulation of the process.  The FDA system was developed only to detect the single 
fault.  Process deviation was detected by x-MR chart.  Some control charts showed the data 
nearly touched the limits, but it was still considered as normal condition.  Summary of the 
output results of fault detection and diagnose experiment were tabulated in Table 5.   
 
Table 5  Summary of an experiment for FDA system 
Diagnose Results 
Case 1 Case 2 
Output of 
FDA System 
x MR x MR 
 S1 = TIC 100 N N N N 
 S2 = FIC 101 H H N N 
S3 = Bottom N N L H 
  S4 = Distillate N N H N 
S5 = FIC 105 H N N N 
S6 = TIC 101 N N N N 
  S7 = PI 104 N N N N 
Process 
Condition High flow at sensor 2 Low  flow  at Sensor 3 
Causes and 
consequences 
HAZOP study for More 
Flow at sensor 2 
HAZOP study for Less 
Flow at sensor 3 
 
Fault Case 1: Faulty Condition at Sensor for FIC 101 
In this experiment, two deviating conditions were detected by FDA system.  At 
13318.8 seconds (222 minutes), the flowrate at sensor 2 started to deviate outside the upper 
limits which as shows in Figure 11a.  Sensor 5 also started to deviate after 30 minutes as 
shown in Figure 11b.  Although there was deviation occurred at sensor 5, the system has 
successfully detected the earlier fault point as shows in Figure 11a.  This concluded that 
high flowrate has happened at sensor for FIC 101 Figure 11c illustrates the user interface of 
the other sensors under normal condition.  
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Figure 11a Fault detected and diagnosed results for sensor FIC 101 – sensor 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11b Fault detected and diagnosed results for sensor FIC 101 – sensor 5 
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(i)      (ii) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(iii)      (iv) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(v)      (vi) 
 
Figure 11c  Normal condition for other sensors 
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Fault Case 2: Faulty Condition at Sensor for TIC 101 
The last experiment was based on the fault data at sensor for TIC 101. FDA 
system has analyzed low flowrate occurred at sensor 3 as shown in Figure 12a, x chart 
shows the bottom stream flow started to decrease at 12712.8 seconds (211.9 minutes). 
Suppose the fault for this case was caused by sensor for TIC 101 as shown in Figure 12c. 
Since the temperature at sensor 6 still remains in the range of control limits, conclusion can 
be made that the FDA system has successfully diagnosed the exact location of fault 
occurred and the consequences were caused by the failure of sensor for TIC 101. Figure 
12d illustrates the user interface of process under normal operating condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12a Fault detected and diagnosed results for sensor TIC 101- sensor 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12b Fault detected and diagnosed results for sensor TIC 101 – sensor 4 
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Figure 12c  Fault detected and diagnosed results for sensor of TIC 101 – sensor 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(i) (ii) 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(iii)      (iv)    
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                                                               (v) 
Figure 12d  Normal condition for other sensors 
 
5.0 CONCLUSIONS  
An algorithm was developed for fault detection and diagnosis with the combination of x-M 
chart and HAZOP study supported by rule-based expert system. Plant model was simulated 
by using commercial HYSYS.PlantTM simulator. The x-M chart was used to analyze the 
condition of process and to detect any process deviation that might have taken place. The 
main causes and consequences of the analyzer were specified based on the HAZOP study 
carried out specifically for precut fractionation column.  The HAZOP study carried out was 
based on the process parameter for each existing sensor.  The developed fault diagnostic 
system is aimed to enhance the safety of process operation, to reduce the alarm false and 
aid to operators to cope with fault.  
 
The following are the general conclusions and contributions of the developed Fault 
Diagnostic System: 
 
i. The study combined the application of x-M chart and HAZOP study in developing 
a framework of Fault Diagnostic System especially for a fractionation column.  
ii. The developed FDA system was able to detect the exact time and place of process 
deviation for precut column and then diagnose it.  Information about the root 
cause and consequences were presented.  
iii. The developed Fault Diagnostic System could be applied to any precut 
fractionation column.  This is due to the available section for user to change or 
add additional data in the database and hence, the limits and HAZOP study. 
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